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CRIMINAL LAW-ROBBERY-ONE WHO USES BARE
FISTS IN THE COMMISSION OF A ROBBERY IS NOT
ARMED WITH A DANGEROUS OR DEADLY WEAPON
WITHIN THE MEANING OF CALIFORNIA PENAL
CODE SECTION 211a; FIRST DEGREE ROBBERY CON-
VICTION REDUCED TO SECOND DEGREE. People v.
Dozie (Cal. App. 1964).
The defendants McClinton and Dozie met the victim and drank
with him in several bars. They later drove him to a rural area, beat
him into unconsciousness with bare fists, robbed him, and stole his
car. The defendants were convicted of car theft and first degree rob-
bery, the trial court holding that fists were dangerous or deadly
weapons within the meaning of California Penal Code § 211a.' On
appeal the judgment was modified by reducing the conviction of first
degree robbery to robbery of the second degree.2 The use of naked
hands or fists does not make the crime robbery with a "dangerous or
deadly weapon" within the meaning of § 211a. People v. Dozie, 224
Cal. App. 2d 474, 36 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1964).
There was no question that the defendants had committed rob-
bery. The significant question on appeal was whether the use of bare
fists during the commission of a robbery placed the defendant within
the statutory classification of persons perpetrating a robbery while
armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon. The answer to this ques-
tion is determinative of the degree of the crime under Penal Code
§ 211a. The distinction between first and second degree robbery in
California is important because of the difference in minimum sen-
tences.3
In Dozie it was declared that the distinction between first and
second degree robbery hinges upon the character of the instrumen-
tality with which the offender was armed. A two-step test was ap-
plied, viz. was the defendant armed at the time of the commission
of the robbery, and if so, was the character of the instrument with
which he was armed such that it was of a dangerous or deadly
nature?4 Under this viewpoint a determination of the defendant's
I "All robbery which is perpetrated by torture or by a person being armed with a
dangerous or deadly weapon,... is robbery in the first degree. All other kinds of
robbery are of the second degree." CAL. PEN. CODE § 211a, as amended.
2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1260 provides that the court may reduce the degree of the
offense or the punishment imposed as an incident to modification of the judgment.
3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 213 prescribes a minimum sentence of imprisonment for one
year for persons convicted of second degree robbery while the minimum sentence
prescribed for first degree robbery is imprisonment for five years. Probation may
be granted where there has been a conviction of first degree robbery if the defend-
ant was armed with only a dangerous but not a deadly weapon. CAL. PEN. CODE
§§ 211a, 1203, People v. Raner, 86 Cal. App. 2d 107, 194 P.2d 37 (1948).
4 224 Cal. App. 2d at 476, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
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use of or intent to use the weapon is immaterial. In applying this
test the court said that an offender is armed when "he equips him-
self with some object, device or instrumentality extrinsic to his own
body .... . (Emphasis added.), and since the defendants were not
armed within the scope of this definition it was unnecessary to
decide whether fists are of a dangerous or deadly nature.
It is difficult to rationally dispute the wisdom of the decision
reached in this case because the legislative intent in dividing the
crime of robbery into two degrees seems to have been to deter
would-be felons from carrying any instrument which might cause
great bodily harm to their intended robbery victims.' However, in
light of several earlier California cases it appears that the Dozie
court took too narrow a view of the purpose of the robbery statutes.
In People v. Wood' the defendant knocked his robbery victim
down and kicked him. The defendant was charged with first degree
robbery and convicted. In rejecting the defendant's contention that
there was no evidence that he was armed with a dangerous or deadly
weapon the court held that: "A shod foot is not a weapon in the
strict sense. But it is capable of being so used."8 (Emphasis added.)
The court had no doubt that a shod foot, used as the defendant in-
tended to and in fact did use it, is a dangerous and might well be
a lethal weapon.'
In Wood the court applied the test set out in People v. Raleigh"g
which specifies that in situations where the instrumentality is not a
weapon in the strict sense of the word, but may be used as such,
there is a question of fact to be determined in fixing the degree of
robbery. The character of the instrumentality is established by an
examination of the intent of the defendant and the capability of the
instrumentality for dangerous or deadly use. A finding that the in-
strumentality is capable of dangerous or deadly use, that the de-
fendant intended to use the instrumentality in a dangerous or deadly
manner, and that the defendant had the present ability is tantamount
to a finding that the defendant was armed with a dangerous or
deadly weapon.
z;Ibid.
0 The Legislature in amending CAL. PEN. CODE § 460 made the use of weapons a
factor in dividing burglary into offenses of the first and second degree at the
same time that § 211a dividing robbery into two degrees was enacted.
7 192 Cal. App. 2d 393, 13 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1961).
8 Id. at 396, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
9 There was evidence that the defendant might have used a broken wine bottle in
perpetrating the robbery.
10 128 Cal. App. 105, 16 P.2d 752 (1932).
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In People v. Bennett,1 where the victim was kicked unconscious
and robbed, another test was applied. The court considered the
nature of the object or instrument, the manner of its use, the loca-
tion on the body of the injuries inflicted, and the extent of such
injuries in determining whether an instrument which was not inher-
ently deadly or dangerous had assumed such characteristics. Apply-
ing these criteria the defendant's use of a shod foot to injure his
robbery victim was held to constitute robbery of the first degree.
Comparing the test used in Dozie with the tests applied in the
Raleigh and Bennett cases it is difficult to see a distinguishable dif-
ference between the utilization of a fist or an ordinary shoe in per-
petrating a robbery. It is hard to conceive that a court or jury would
find that a defendant was 'armed' merely because he committed the
crime while wearing shoes, even though a shoe is technically ex-
trinsic to the body.
Under the Dozie viewpoint the trained karate expert who spends
years fashioning his hand into a weapon, and the trained prize
fighter would, apparently, not be armed with a dangerous or a
deadly weapon were they to use their bare hands in perpetrating t
robbery.
Does the element of attempted use, which was not a factor in the
Dozie decision, necessarily affect the determination of whether a
defendant is guilty of first or second degree robbery? California
courts have answered this question affirmatively in at least two in-
stances. In People v. O'Neal3 it was said that a dangerous or deadly
weapon or instrument is characterized by the manner with which it
is used or attempted to be used if it is likely to produce death or
cause great bodily harm. The question is one of fact for the jury.
O'Neal was cited with approval in 1959 in People v. Liner.4
It is curious that the courts have discussed cases involving the
crime of assault with a deadly weapon 5 when dealing with cases
arising under the robbery statutes,1" especially since the court said as
early as 1925 in People v. Seawright" that first degree robbery does
not require an assault, but requires only that the accused be armed
with a dangerous or deadly weapon.
1 208 Cal. App. 2d 317, 25 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1962).
12 See People v. Russell, 59 Cal. App. 2d 660, 139 P.2d 661 (1943). This case in-
volved an assault with a deadly weapon (CAL. PEN. CODE § 245) and is there-
fore doubtful authority in robbery cases.
13 2 Cal. 2d 551, 38 P.2d 430 (1934).
14 168 Cal. App. 2d 411, 335 P.2d 964 (1959).
25 CAL. PEN. CODE § 245.
16 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 211, 211a.
17 72 Cal. App. 414, 237 Pac. 796 (1925).
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It is apparent that a uniform test should be promulgated by the
California Supreme Court so that there will be consistency in the
decisions of the California District Courts of Appeal when they
deal with the California robbery statutes. It is submitted that a rea-
sonable test could be phrased in the following terms:
First: A robbery is of the first degree if during the commission of
the robbery the defendant was armed with an inherently dangerous
weapon, or a deadly weapon such as a loaded firearm, a knife with
a blade exceeding a specified length (e.g., 5 inches), or an instru-
mentality mentioned in Penal Code § 12020.18
Second: The robbery is also of the first degree if during the com-
mission of the robbery the defendant possessed the means to inflict
great bodily injury and intended to inflict, or threatened to inflict,
or actually did inflict great bodily injury.
Third: Robbery perpetrated in any other manner is of the second
degree.
Paul C. McEwen, Jr.
18 CAL. PEN. CODE § 12020. "Any person . . . who ... possesses any instrument
or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, slung shot, billy, sand-
club, sandbag, or metal knuckles, or who carries concealed upon his person any
explosive substance, other than fixed ammunition, or... any dirk or dagger, is
guilty of a felony, .... "
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